Opinion 202505

Advisory Opinion: 2025-05
Year Issued: 2025
RPCs: 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 3.3, 5.1, and 5.3
Subject: Artificial Intelligence-Enabled Tools in Law Practice
I. Introduction
Artificial intelligence has long been predicted to fundamentally reshape the legal
profession. [n.1] This advisory opinion takes on a narrower topic: the ethical implications of using
emerging artificial intelligence-enabled tools in law practice. [n. 2]
This advisory opinion uses the term “artificial intelligence”—AI—broadly to include
“machine-based” AI that has existed for several years and focuses on making predictions or
recommendations [n. 3], more recent “generative” AI that is trained to create new data and make
related decisions [n. 4], rising forms of such as agentic AI that function as an agent for the user,
and future forms such as autonomous AI that may function with a substantial degree of
independence. [n. 5] “Artificial intelligence-enabled tools”—AI tools—in turn, refers broadly to
software/hardware products and services. [n. 6, 7] Some are new standalone products, such as
web or device-based “apps,” while others are products familiar to lawyers in daily practice that
incorporate AI, such as legal research services. We have intentionally not attempted to focus on
either specific products or narrow definitions in recognition that the technology is evolving rapidly.
Rather, as noted, we have opted for broad considerations and general definitions in an effort to
provide useful guidance over time going forward in a landscape likely poised for continual
evolution.
AI tools presently used in or entering law practice [n. 8] encompass three diverse
categories. First, some are open-source consumer products available to a wide spectrum of users
that may be used in law practice. [n. 9] Second, others are products specifically tailored to law
practice or other business users that include contractual assurances of confidentiality, similar to
those commonly offered by commercial electronic communication and data storage providers. [n.
10] Third, emerging AI developments, while difficult to predict precisely, offer services that
augment or possibly replace operating procedures and functions that law firms currently employ.
[n. 11] Although the underlying duties are the same with all these categories, the practical
analysis can differ.
This Advisory Opinion addresses seven duties under the Washington RPCs when using AI
tools in law practice: (1) competence under RPC 1.1; (2) diligence under RPC 1.3; (3)
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confidentiality under RPC 1.6; (4) communication under RPC 1.4; (5) candor toward tribunals
under RPC 3.3; (6) supervision of other lawyers and nonlawyers under, respectively, RPCs 5.1
and 5.3; and (7) billing for their use consistent with RPC 1.5.
By discussing these areas, we do not suggest that these are the only topics that
are or may become relevant to lawyers’ use of AI tools. Rather, these are simply some of
the more commonly encountered sets of issues to date. [n. 12] Similarly, for each area
addressed, we have included illustrations. By offering these examples, we do not suggest
that they are the only ways that such issues can arise. Further, by focusing on the topics
selected, we also do not suggest that other law-related areas will not be impacted by AI.
Finally, we have not evaluated substantive law beyond the RPCs—such as copyright and
general data security law—that intersect with AI but are beyond the charge of our
Committee.
Finally, our intent with the present advisory opinion is to provide broad guidance
about general issues. We readily acknowledge and anticipate that specific practice areas
and issues may warrant future advisory opinions tailored to those areas or issues as
circumstances warrant.
II. Analysis
A. Duty of Competence
Lawyers must understand the technology they use in law practice.
RPC 1.1 states the duty of competence:
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation
requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary
for the representation.
Comment 8 to RPC 1.1 explains that the duty of competence includes understanding
technology used in law practice sufficiently to use it consistent with a lawyer’s duties under the
RPCs:
To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep abreast of
changes in the law and its practice, including the benefits and risks associated with
relevant technology[.] [n. 13] (Emphasis added.)
In some instances, the use of technology in law practice is required—such as electronic
filing mandated by court rules. [n. 14] In others, the use of technology may be a matter of
personal choice or practical imperative—such as electronic documents with embedded metadata.
[n. 15] Regardless of whether the use of a particular technology is required or is by choice, a
lawyer using technology in law practice is obliged to do so competently. [n. 16] An author
speaking of law practice technology generally neatly captured the practical import of the duty of
competence in this regard:
Competence does not mean perfection, expertise, or paranoia. It does not mean
that lawyers must now become early adopters, anxious to discover, purchase, and learn
every possible new piece of legal tech. But it does require a baseline understanding of,
and reasonable proficiency in, the technology at hand. [n. 17]
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With AI-enabled general consumer products used in law practice, a lawyer must
understand them sufficiently to use them consistent with the lawyer’s duties under the RPCs. In a
widely reported decision from New York, for example, a lawyer used a consumer-oriented AIenabled
web application to produce a brief that included citations to non-existent cases that the
lawyer then filed in federal court without first checking them. [n. 18] When the court discovered
the non-existent citations, the lawyer claimed a lack of understanding of how the application
worked. [n. 19] The court sanctioned the lawyer nonetheless. [n. 20] Similarly, the ABA in Formal
Opinion 498 (2021) noted that some “smart speakers” used as “virtual assistants” have default
settings in which they “listen” for commands and may, therefore, allow their vendors to overhear
confidential communications. [n. 21] ABA Formal Opinion 498 recommended that lawyers disable
this feature if they use them in law practice. [n. 22] Although the RPCs do not prohibit the use of
consumer-oriented AI-enabled products in law practice, lawyers must be sensitive to the fact that
they may include features that must be understood and, if necessary, modified to make them
compatible with law practice. In other instances where protection of client confidential information
cannot be reasonably assured, lawyers should not use consumer-oriented AI tools.
With AI tools that are tailored to law practice and similar settings, a lawyer must
understand them sufficiently to use them consistent with the lawyer’s duties under the RPCs. With
AI tools tailored to law practice, appropriate use of these products often (but not exclusively) turns
on their contractual assurances of confidentiality consistent with lawyers’ duties under RPC 1.6.
Lawyers should understand the contractual terms of use and keep abreast of updated terms or
privacy notifications from the vendor. In other words, it is not sufficient to simply note that an AI
vendor offers a contractual assurance of confidentiality; rather, the terms must meet a lawyer’s
duty of confidentiality under RPC 1.6. WSBA Advisory Opinion 2215 (2012) discussed contractual
terms of use in the analogous setting of cloud-based electronic file storage as part of a lawyer’s
duty of competence under RPC 1.1. [n. 23] While not an exclusive list, Advisory Opinion 2215
suggested that lawyers evaluate a vendor’s contractual assurances in the context of overall
industry practice, the vendor’s record of meeting those obligations, and how information is handled
by the vendor. Advisory Opinion 2215 also stressed that because technology changes over time,
a lawyer’s review cannot be static and must be revisited at appropriate intervals to give continued
reasonable assurance that the product or service involved is still meeting standards compatible
with those applicable to law practice. [n. 24] Advisory Opinion 2215 further notes that if particular
nuances are beyond the lawyer’s training and experience to evaluate, the lawyer should seek
appropriate technical assistance in evaluating the vendor. We think that the general guidelines
outlined in Advisory Opinion 2215 apply with equal measure to lawyers evaluating and using AI
tools—whether standalone or incorporated into products commonly used in law practice.
At the same time, given the breadth of potential uses of AI tools in law practice, lawyers
will also need to assess whether a particular tool is suitable for a given task and to evaluate its
technical attributes in that regard. Depending on the circumstances, that may include an
assessment of how the tool was trained and whether the training data may influence its results. In
short, lawyers are responsible for the selection of particular tools used to carry out a
representation and the lawyer—not the tool—is ultimately responsible for the work concerned. [n.
25.]
Whether considering products familiar to law practice that incorporate AI or new tools that
promise to augment or replace existing operating procedures and functions, [n. 26] lawyers using
them need to understand how they work so that they will be used consistent with the lawyer’s duty
of competence. [n. 27] Although the New York case noted earlier was an extreme example, it also
underscored that lawyers remain ultimately responsible for their work under RPC 1.1—whether
aided by AI tools or not.
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Illustration
Amanda, a junior associate at a mid-sized law firm, is assigned a complex litigation case.
Feeling overwhelmed by the volume of documents and tight deadlines, she decides to use a newly
released AI legal research tool to assist with her work.
The AI tool that Amanda relied on is marketed as a cutting-edge AI product that can
analyze vast amounts of legal documents, extract key information, and even draft legal memos.
The product's website claims it can revolutionize legal research and writing.
Amanda's Actions
1. Without reasonably investigating the AI tool’s capabilities and limitations, Amanda inputs
sensitive client information and case details into the system.
2. She relies heavily on the AI tool to conduct legal research, accepting its findings without
independently verifying the accuracy or relevance of the cited cases.
3. Amanda uses the AI tool to draft a crucial motion, making only minor edits to the AIgenerated
text before submitting it to the partner for review.
4. When the partner asks about her research methodology, Amanda simply states that she
used advanced AI technology without explaining the specific process or her level of
oversight.
Competence (RPC 1.1):
Amanda’s actions implicate the duty of competence by:
- Failing to understand the limitations and potential risks of the AI tool
- Not critically analyzing the AI-generated output for accuracy and relevance.
- Relying on AI without exercising independent professional judgment.
B. Duty of Diligence
An AI tool that promises more efficiency must still be used competently.
RPC 1.3, in turn, outlines the duty of diligence:
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a
client.
Although diligence focuses largely on handling a client’s work with the attentiveness
reasonably appropriate to the task involved, Comment 2 to RPC 1.3 notes that diligence is closely
tethered to competence. In other words, to the extent an AI tool promises to make handling a task
more efficient, a lawyer must still use it with the requisite technical competence. In People v.
Crabill, 2023 WL 8111898 (Colo. Nov. 22, 2023) (unpublished), for example, a Colorado lawyer
failed to act with reasonable diligence by using an AI tool to write a motion without verifying the
accuracy of the citations the AI tool generated. The lawyer then filed a brief containing fictitious
citations that were later discovered by the trial judge. The lawyer was disciplined under
Colorado’s analogous version of RPC 1.3 (and its similar version of RPC 1.1).
Illustration
See previous hypothetical.
Diligence (RPC 1.3):
Amanda’s actions implicate the duty of diligence by:
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- Not thoroughly reviewing and scrutinizing the AI-generated motion for legal and factual
soundness.
- Failing to independently verify the cases and legal arguments presented by the AI tool.
The consequences of Amanda’s actions can have a devastating impact on the case as
follows:
1. The motion may contain inaccuracies, irrelevant citations, or even non-existent cases,
potentially harming the client's case.
2. Amanda's lack of understanding of the AI tool's functionality could lead to inadvertent
disclosure of confidential client information
3. If the court or opposing counsel discovers the heavy reliance on AI without proper
oversight, it could damage the firm's reputation and potentially lead to sanctions.
4. Amanda's supervising attorney might also face ethical violations for inadequate
supervision under RPC 5.1.
This example underscores the importance of lawyers maintaining their professional
responsibilities even when using advanced AI tools. While AI can enhance efficiency, it cannot
replace the critical thinking, judgment, and ethical obligations of a competent and diligent attorney.
In short, lawyers cannot cede either their professional judgment or their responsibility for work to
AI tools.
C. Duty of Confidentiality
Confidentiality embraces both information shared with an AI tool and how it is used.
Subject to specific exceptions, Washington RPC 1.6(a) states the duty of confidentiality:
A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client[.]
Washington RPC 1.6(c), in turn, outlines a lawyer’s duty to take reasonable steps to
protect client confidentiality:
A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized
disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information relating to the representation of a
client. [n. 28]
Comments 18 and 19 to RPC 1.6 weave together the duties of competence and
confidentiality under the subtitle “Acting Competently to Preserve Confidentiality” and speak to
these duties when using technology:
[18] Paragraph (c) requires a lawyer to act competently to safeguard information
relating to the representation of a client against unauthorized access by third parties and
against inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure by the lawyer or other persons who are
participating in the representation of the client or who are subject to the lawyer’s
supervision. See RPC 1.1, 5.1 and 5.3. The unauthorized access to, or the inadvertent or
unauthorized disclosure of, information relating to the representation of a client does not
constitute a violation of paragraph (c) if the lawyer has made reasonable efforts to prevent
the access or disclosure. Factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of
the lawyer’s efforts include, but are not limited to, the sensitivity of the information, the
likelihood of disclosure if additional safeguards are not employed, the cost of employing
additional safeguards, the difficulty of implementing the safeguards, and the extent to
which the safeguards adversely affect the lawyer’s ability to represent clients (e.g., by
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making a device or important piece of software excessively difficult to use). A client may
require the lawyer to implement special security measures not required by this rule or may
give informed consent to forgo security measures that would otherwise be required by this
rule. Whether a lawyer may be required to take additional steps to safeguard a client’s
information in order to comply with other law, such as state and federal laws that govern
data privacy or that impose notification requirements upon the loss of, or unauthorized
access to, electronic information, is beyond the scope of these rules. For a lawyer’s duties
when sharing information with nonlawyers outside the lawyer’s own firm, see RPC 5.3,
Comments [3]-[4].
[19] When transmitting a communication that includes information relating to
the representation of a client, the lawyer must take reasonable precautions to
prevent the information from coming into the hands of unintended recipients. This
duty, however, does not require that the lawyer use special security measures if the
method of communication affords a reasonable expectation of privacy. Special
circumstances, however, may warrant special precautions. Factors to be
considered in determining the reasonableness of the lawyer’s expectation of
confidentiality include the sensitivity of the information and the extent to which the
privacy of the communication is protected by law or by a confidentiality agreement.
A client may require the lawyer to implement special security measures not
required by this Rule or may give informed consent to the use of a means of
communication that would otherwise be prohibited by this Rule. Whether a lawyer
may be required to take additional steps in order to comply with other law, such as
state and federal laws that govern data privacy, is beyond the scope of these rules.
Although the duty of confidentiality remains the same, its practical import can vary
depending on whether an AI-enabled product is developed primarily for consumers or is tailored to
business and professional settings that include contractual assurances of confidentiality.
Some AI-enabled consumer products don’t include contractual assurances of
confidentiality thereby posing an unreasonable risk to confidential client information. In the New
York sanctions decision discussed earlier, for example, the lawyer using the AI-enabled web
application entered an increasingly specific series of prompts that revealed detailed client
information—notwithstanding a disclaimer on the product concerned that data entered would not
be kept confidential. [n. 29] The sanction was entered based on the non-existent cases the
application generated and the lawyer used without checking their accuracy. Entering identifiable
client confidential information into a non-confidential product, however, raises serious concerns
under RPC 1.6. For example, lawyers may believe that entering a search in a public system using
the “incognito” setting will be safe for their search—but it may not completely preserve
confidentiality.
The duty of confidentiality under RPC 1.6 is broad—defined as “information related to the
representation of a client” and extending beyond privilege and work product standing alone. [n. 30]
Moreover, a lawyer need not specifically intend to reveal confidential information to find a violation
of RPC 1.6 if the lawyer intended the act that did, in fact, reveal the information. [n. 31] For
example, as discussed earlier, ABA Formal Opinion 498 noted that using “smart speakers” with
their “listening” function enabled may violate a lawyer’s duty to protect confidential information.
Similarly, lawyers should not share client confidential information with an AI-enabled product
without verifying that the product will protect their client’s confidentiality consistent with RPC 1.6.
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Commercial AI tools that include contractual assurances of confidentiality should be
evaluated using the general factors outlined earlier from Advisory Opinion 2215. [n. 32] In
particular, the contractual terms should be examined to determine if the vendor uses the data
involved for any other purpose (such as training the AI tool involved) and, if so, whether those
purposes are compatible with the duty of confidentiality. [n. 33] Further, as reflected in
Comments 18 and 19 to RPC 1.6 quoted above, and as discussed in Section D below, the
sensitivity of the information involved in a particular representation may necessitate consultation
with the client and, in some instances, obtaining the client’s informed consent under RPC 1.6(a)
before using an AI tool. [n. 34] Again as reflected in Comments 18 and 19 to RPC 1.6, clients
may direct lawyers to refrain from using particular AI tools in some circumstances or may place
other limits on such use.
Reflecting the intersecting duties of competence and confidentiality discussed in
Comments 18 and 19 to RPC 1.6, lawyers are responsible for understanding AI tools sufficiently to
protect client confidentiality in their actual use. [n. 35] For example, lawyers must understand
end-user agreements and privacy policies that impact confidentiality. Similarly, lawyers using
“chat bots” to assist with client intake by gathering preliminary information, should consider the
use of appropriate disclaimers of an attorney-client relationship until expressly formed with the
lawyer or law firm and related explanations on whether prospective clients may—or may not—
supply preliminary information with an assurance of confidentiality. [n. 36] By using this example,
we do not foreclose others. Rather, regardless of the product or service—whether existing or
future—the duties of competence and confidentiality ultimately remain the lawyer’s—not the
product manufacturer or the service provider.
Illustration
Frank, a criminal defense attorney is hired on a complex case for a high-profile client.
Feeling overwhelmed by the volume of discovery and tight deadlines, Frank decides to use a
popular public-facing generative AI tool, such as ChatGPT, to help him draft a legal memo to the
court. Frank inputs specific details about the case [n. 37] into the AI tool, including:
1. The client's name and identifying information
2. Confidential case strategies discussed with the client
3. Details of plea negotiations
4. Privileged communications between the client and the lawyer and paralegals
By entering this confidential information into a public AI platform, Frank’s actions implicate
the duty of confidentiality in several ways:
Unauthorized disclosure: The AI tool's employees may have access to the chat history,
potentially exposing privileged information to unauthorized third parties
Data retention and usage: The AI platform may store and use the inputted information to train its
model, making the confidential data potentially accessible to future users
Security risks: Public-facing AI tools may not have adequate security measures to protect
sensitive legal information from cyber threats or data breaches.
Waiver of attorney-client privilege: By sharing privileged communications with the AI tool, Frank
may inadvertently waive the attorney-client privilege, making those communications potentially
discoverable by opposing counsel
Frank’s actions implicate RPC 1.6, which requires lawyers to maintain client confidentiality.
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Lawyers should thoroughly vet AI platforms for security and privacy measures and avoid inputting
any sensitive or privileged information into public-facing AI tools. The next section addresses the
issue of client consent.
D. Duty of Communication
Communication about AI tools will vary with the tool and the client.
RPC 1.4 outlines a lawyer’s duty of communication. Although the rule is multi-faceted, two
elements in particular potentially bear on a lawyer’s use of AI tools.
First, RPC 1.4(a)(2) requires a lawyer to “reasonably consult with the client about the
means by which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished[.]”
Second, RPC 1.4(b) requires “[a] lawyer . . . [to] . . . explain a matter to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the matter.”
Echoing the analysis in the preceding section on confidentiality, in some instances, no
specific discussion of AI tools may be required when, for example, they are tailored to law practice
and offer contractual assurances of confidentiality consistent with RPC 1.6. In others, however,
even if they do not require the client’s informed consent under RPC 1.6, a lawyer’s use of AI tools
may nonetheless be required to conform to specific client objectives, requests, or preferences.
ABA Formal Opinion 512 (2024), which surveys AI issues from a national perspective, concluded
(and we agree) that circumstances will dictate the extent and nature of the communication
reasonably required:
It is not possible to catalogue every situation in which lawyers must inform clients
about their use of . . . [AI tools]. Again, lawyers should consider whether the specific
circumstances warrant client consultation about the use of a . . . [AI] tool, including the
client’s needs and expectations, the scope of the representation, and the sensitivity of the
information involved. [n. 38]
ABA Formal Opinion 512 notes (at 9)—and again, we concur—that if circumstances
warrant discussion with the client about the use of AI tools (whether they rise to the level of
informed consent under RPC 1.6 or not), an engagement agreement is a logical place to
memorialize those discussions, any related instructions from the client, and, if applicable, the
client’s informed consent.
Illustration
Here's an example of how a lawyer can violate the duty of communication when using an
AI product without obtaining informed consent:
Lola, a personal injury attorney, decides to exclusively use a new AI-powered legal
research and drafting tool that her firm purchased to assist with her cases. She uses this tool from
the inception of the case – which included drafting the initial demand letter to later developing
legal memos and briefs in preparation for trial. The AI tool has been trained and tested by the law
firm and most of the time produces consistent results.
Lola is able to complete her cases in a fraction of the time and has become complacent
checking the results of the AI tool given the success in past cases.
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Lola is hired by Jeremy in a medical malpractice case. Lola uses the same contract for
legal services in Jeremy’s case as she has used for years. This contract does not have a
separate provision for the client to give informed consent for use of an AI product.
Lola also fails to orally communicate her use of the AI tool to her client. Lola then uses
the AI product on the case, inserting confidential information into the system and extracting legal
documents for use in the case.
While there may be multiple ethical issues, Lola's actions implicate the duty of
communication in the following ways:
1. Failure to disclose AI usage: Lola does not inform Jeremy that she is using an AI
products to conduct legal research and draft documents for his case.
2. Lack of informed consent: Lola fails to obtain Jeremy’s approval before inputting his
confidential information into the AI system.
3. Inadequate explanation of risks: Lola does not discuss the potential risks and limitations
of using an AI product with Jeremy, such as data privacy concerns or the possibility of AIgenerated
errors.
4. Omission of available alternatives: Lola neglects to explain the reasonably available
alternatives to using AI in Jeremy's case, preventing him from making an informed
decision.
5. Non-disclosure of AI's role: When presenting legal strategies or documents to Jeremy,
Lola does not mention that they were partially generated or influenced by an AI product.
This example underscores the importance of communication. RPC 1.4 require lawyers to
reasonably consult with clients about the means used to accomplish their objectives. By failing to
communicate her use of AI and obtain informed consent, Lola deprives Jeremy of the opportunity
to make an informed decision about his representation and potentially exposes his confidential
information to unauthorized disclosure.
E. Candor Toward the Tribunal
Lawyers are responsible for the accuracy of their court filings.
RPC 3.3 outlines a lawyer’s duty of candor toward a tribunal. The term “tribunal,” in turn, is
defined broadly by RPC 1.0A(m) to include both courts and other “adjudicative” forums such as
arbitrations and administrative agency proceedings.
Of particular relevance to the present topic, RPC 3.3(a)(1) prohibits a lawyer from making
“a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or
law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer[.]” In People v. Crabill, supra, 2023 WL 8111898
(Colo. Nov. 22, 2023) (unpublished), for example, the Colorado lawyer who used an AI tool in
preparing a motion failed to inform the court concerned when the lawyer discovered that the AI
tool had generated fictitious citations that the lawyer had not verified before filing the motion. The
lawyer was also disciplined under Colorado’s analogous version of RPC 3.3(a)(1). [n. 39]
Similarly, a lawyer is also obliged generally under RPC 3.3(c) to alert the court to material
evidence that the lawyer has discovered is false. In Kohls v. Ellison, 2025 WL 66514 (D. Minn.
Jan. 10, 2025) (unpublished), for example, the Minnesota Attorney General informed the court
when he learned that an expert declaration his office had submitted included citations to nonexistent
academic articles generated by an AI tool. The court struck the declaration involved. [n.
40]
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Illustration
Attorney Adam represents a client on an appeal in federal court. Pressed for time and
overwhelmed by the volume of research required, Adam decides to use a generative AI tool to
help draft a key motion. The AI generates several persuasive arguments, complete with case
citations.
Adam incorporates the AI-generated content into his motion without thoroughly verifying
the citations or arguments. He submits the motion to the court without further review.
During oral arguments, the opposing counsel points out that two of the key cases cited in
Adam's motion do not exist. The judge, unable to locate these cases, asks Adam to explain. Adam
admits to using an AI tool but insists he believed the cases were real.
In this scenario, Adam’s actions implicate the ethical rule of candor to the tribunal in
several ways:
1. He submits false information to the court by including non-existent cases and fabricated
arguments.
2. He fails to verify the accuracy of the AI-generated content before submitting it to the court.
3. When confronted, he does not immediately correct the false information, instead
attempting to defend its validity.
This example shows the importance of lawyers understanding AI limitations, critically
reviewing AI-generated content, and maintaining their ethical obligations when using such
technology in legal practice. Adam's actions could result in sanctions and damage to his
reputation.
F. Duty of Supervision
Those using AI tools must receive adequate training and supervision.
RPCs 5.1 and 5.3 [n. 41] address, respectively, a lawyer’s duty to supervise other lawyers
and nonlawyers. These duties extend to both lawyers and nonlawyers directly employed by a law
firm or legal department, [n. 42] and independent contractors and vendors assisting a lawyer with
a client’s work. [n. 43]
In the context of AI tools, the duty of supervision has two primary aspects.
First, lawyers who supervise others—whether as a part of firm management or through
direct supervision—have a responsibility to train lawyers and nonlawyers in the appropriate use of
AI tools so they will be used in a manner consistent with the duties of competence and
confidentiality discussed above.
Second, lawyers working with vendors supplying AI tools have a duty to evaluate the
contractual assurances and other technical safeguards included in a particular product to ensure
that its use is also consistent with the duties of competence and confidentiality as noted earlier.
Illustration
Anne, a senior partner at a large law firm, decides to implement a new AI-powered legal
research tool across the firm. The firm’s IT department researched an AI tool that would provide
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protections of client confidentiality and utilize a system where it did not train on outside data.
Anne, excited about potential efficiency on cases, quickly rolled out the software to all
associates and paralegals, providing only a brief email introduction on its basic functions. Anne
left a more thorough training on the product up to the individual users.
Anne assigns a complex divorce case to Gabe. There are strict time limitations in place.
Anne encourages Gabe to use the new AI tool. Gabe inputs some case details and asks the AI to
generate arguments and find supporting case law. Without thoroughly reviewing the AI-generated
content, Gabe incorporates it into the motion and submits it to Anne for final approval.
Anne, busy with a time-consuming trial – put trust into both the AI tool and Gabe’s work.
She gives the motion a cursory glance before filing it with the court. During the hearing, the judge
points out that several key cases cited in the motion that are misquoted. Upon investigation, it's
revealed that the AI tool had "hallucinated" these cases and citations.
In this example, Anne’s actions implicate the duty of supervision in several ways:
1. Inadequate training: Anne failed to provide proper training on the ethical use and
limitations of the AI tool.
2. Clear AI use policies: Anne did not establish clear guidelines for the use of AI in legal
work, including the need for human verification. It is best practice for the firm to have an AI
use policy handbook as well as regular training for employees who utilize the product.
3. Lack of proper review of the motion: Anne did not adequately review Gabe's work or
ensure that he had properly vetted the AI-generated content.
4. Too much reliance on technology: By trusting the AI tool without question, Anne
delegated her professional judgment to the AI, which is a violation of ethical standards.
This hypothetical highlights the need for comprehensive training, clear policies, and
maintaining human oversight and professional judgment when using AI in legal work.
G. Duties under RPC 1.5
Billing for the use of AI tools must be reasonable.
RPC 1.5(a) prohibits a lawyer from making an agreement for, charging, or collecting an
unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. RPC 1.5(b), in turn, requires that a
lawyer explain the basis of fees and expenses at the outset of a representation and later if there is
a modification to either. Comment 1 to RPC 1.5 explains further for expenses that “[a] lawyer may
seek reimbursement for the cost of services performed in-house, such as copying, or for other
expenses incurred in-house, such as telephone charges, either by charging a reasonable amount
to which the client has agreed in advance or by charging an amount that reflects the cost incurred
by the lawyer.” [n. 44] Whether and how a lawyer or law firm may charge for the use of AI tools
will vary with the circumstances and the lawyer or law firm’s agreement with the clients concerned.
Some, for example, may simply absorb those costs as overhead that is reflected in the firm’s fee
structure. Others, by contrast, may bill them separately as an expense. Regardless, any method
of recouping the cost of AI tools must comply with RPC 1.5.
Further, AI tools may make some billable tasks more efficient. While lawyers may charge
for time spent using AI tools—for example, creating appropriate prompts analogous to creating
search terms for more traditional legal research programs—they may not charge for the “time
saved” under RPC 1.5(a). In the analogous context of legal research, courts have noted that time
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spent using computer-aided legal research is potentially recoverable (depending on the fee
recovery statute or rule involved) because “[p]roperly utilitzed, it saves the client attorney fees
which would otherwise be incurred for more time-consuming methods of legal research.” [n. 45]
Illustration
Maria, a lawyer at a small busy law firm purchased a sophisticated AI-powered legal
research and document drafting tool for her practice. The AI tool was expensive, and Maria wants
to pass along some of this expense to her clients for use in their cases.
Maria decides to use the AI tool on a simple case whereby she is reviewing and analyzing
the contract. Maria then uses the AI tool which analyzes the contract and generates a
comprehensive report with suggested revisions. The entire process, including Maria's review of
the AI-generated content, takes only 2 hours.
However, Maria decides to bill her client for 10 hours of work at her usual hourly rate,
reasoning that the AI tool's efficiency shouldn't reduce her billable hours. She justifies this by
thinking about the time it would have taken her to do the work manually and the value provided to
the client.
Maria’s actions implicate RPC1.5 in several ways:
1. Unreasonable fee: By billing for 10 hours when the work only took 2 hours, Maria is
charging an unreasonable fee that doesn't reflect the actual time spent on the task.
2. Overhead cost: Maria cannot pass on the cost of her overhead expenses to the client,
without their informed consent in the use of the product. If the product costs to use it each
time, then Maria should inform the client and get their consent to use this product in their
case.
3. Misrepresentation: Maria is essentially misrepresenting the amount of time spent on the
work, which violates the ethical obligation of honesty and transparency in billing practices.
To comply with Rule 1.5, Maria should instead:
1. Bill only for the actual time spent (2 hours) on the task, including the time used to review
and refine the AI-generated content.
2. Consider adjusting her fee structure to reflect the value provided rather than time spent,
such as implementing alternative fee arrangements.
3. Disclose the use of AI tools to the client and explain how it affects billing, ensuring
transparency in the fee agreement.
4. Potentially bill separately for the cost of using the AI tool as a reasonable expense, if
agreed upon with the client in advance.
By following these guidelines, Maria would maintain ethical billing practices while
leveraging AI technology to benefit both her practice and her clients.
III. Conclusion
AI tools will undoubtedly continue to evolve and become more commonplace in daily law
practice. Although they can assist lawyers in delivering legal services, they do not relieve lawyers
of the core duties discussed in this advisory opinion.
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1. See generally Anthony E. Davis, The Future of Law Firms (and Lawyers) in the Age of
Artificial Intelligence, 27 No. 1 Prof. Lawyer 3 (2020).
2. This opinion does not address ethical questions encountered by lawyers who may be
embedded with software development teams or otherwise advising corporations, vendors,
or venture capital funds who seek to develop or promote commercial AI-enabled products
or features.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 9401(3) (codifying National Artificial Intelligence Act of 2020 and defining
AI as “a machine-based system that can, for a given set of human-defined objectives,
make predictions, recommendations or decisions influencing real or virtual
environments.”).
4. “Generative AI can be thought of as a machine-learning model that is trained to create
new data, rather than making a prediction about a specific dataset. A generative AI
system is one that learns to generate more objects that look like the data it was trained
on.” https://news.mit.edu/2023/explained-generative-ai-1109. By using the term
“generative AI,” we do not mean to limit the guidance offered in this opinion solely to that
technology. Rather, we anticipate that AI will continue to evolve.
5. See generally Chanley T. Howell and Alexander J. Liederman, “The Intersection of
Agentic AI and Emerging Legal Frameworks,” National Law Review, Dec. 19, 2024
(available at www.natlawreview.com); Catherine Sanders Reach, “The Emergence of
Agentic AI,” ABA Law Practice Magazine, July 3, 2025 (available at
www.americanbar.org).
6. For simplicity, this advisory opinion uses the term “products” broadly to reflect
hardware, software, and associated services.
7. See generally Daniel W. Linna Jr. and Wendy J. Muchman, Ethical Obligations to
Protect Client Data When Building Artificial Intelligence Tools: Wigmore Meets AI, 27 No.
1 Prof. Lawyer 27 (2020).
8. We acknowledge that the observations in this advisory opinion are inherently limited to
present use of AI tools in a rapidly developing area. ABA Formal Opinion 512 (2024),
which surveys AI issues in law practice from a national perspective, put it this way (at 2):
“AI tools are a moving target—indeed a rapidly moving target—in the sense that their
precise features and utility to law practice area quickly changing and will continue to
change in ways that may be difficult or impossible to anticipate.” We have intentionally
sought to focus our analysis, therefore, on core duties rather than specific products.
9. See, e.g., Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 678 F. Supp.3d 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (web-based
consumer application); ABA Formal Op. 498 at 6 (2021) (smart speakers).
10. See, e.g., ABA Formal Op. 477R (electronic communication, data transmission and
storage); WSBA Advisory Op. 2215 (2012) (cloud storage of electronic files). As
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discussed further, because vendor terms and the technological environment change,
lawyers must periodically reassess the contractual assurances provided by vendors to
evaluate whether they remain consistent with lawyers’ duties.
11. See, e.g., ABA Formal Op. 506 (2023) at 2 (noting that law firms increasingly use
technology to augment human interactions in preliminary client intake tasks).
12. Other recent studies, for example, have also touched on potential unauthorized
practice of law and lawyer marketing issues. See New York State Bar Association Task
Force on Artificial Intelligence, Report and Recommendations at 31 (Apr. 6, 2024)
(surveying potential unauthorized practice issues); Florida Bar Ethics. Op. 24-1 at 7 (Jan.
19, 2024) (surveying potential lawyer marketing issues).
13. Comment 8 was amended to include the reference to technological competence in
2016. See Washington Supreme Court Order 25700-A-1146 (June 2, 2016). The
Washington amendment followed a similar amendment to the corresponding ABA Model
Rule comment in 2012. See ABA, A Legislative History: The Development of the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 1982-2013 (ABA Legislative History) at 42-43
(2013). The ABA amendment was developed by the ABA’s Ethics 20/20 Commission and
reflected the Commission’s focus on, in relevant part, technology in law practice. Id.
14. See, e.g., U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington LCR 5(d).
15. See, e.g., WSBA Advisory Op. 2216 (2012) (using electronic documents with
embedded metadata); ABA Formal Op. 06-442 (2006) (same).
16. See, e.g., In re Hilborn, 22 D.B. Rptr. 102 (Or. 2008) (lawyer disciplined under Oregon
RPC 1.1 for failure to understand mandatory federal court electronic filing technology);
Hur v. Lloyd & Williams, LLC, 25 Wn. App.2d 644, 654 n.6, 523 P.3d 851 (2023) (noting
the requirement of technological competence under RPC 1.1 when using electronic
documents with embedded metadata).
17. Ivy B. Grey, Exploring the Ethical Duties of Technology Competence, Part I, ABA Law
Technology Today, Mar. 8, 2017 (available on the ABA’s web site).
18. Mata v. Avianca, Inc., supra, 678 F. Supp.3d 443.
19. Id.
20. Id. Referring to this case in his 2023 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary (2023
Year-End Report), Chief Justice Roberts pithily described (at 6) not cite-checking cases to
ensure their accuracy as “[a]lways a bad idea.”
21. ABA Formal Op. 498 at 6. See also Jan L. Jacobowitz, Happy Birthday Siri! Dialing
in Legal Ethics for Artificial Intelligence, Smartphones, and Real Time Lawyers, 4 Tex.
A&M J. Prop. L. 407, 420-24 (2018) (discussing “smart speakers” used by lawyers as
“virtual assistants”). These confidentiality issues have been accentuated with the
Page 15 of 17
increasing norm of “remote work” where lawyers and staff are working from home and
such consumer products may play both work and personal roles distinct from their use in
a traditional “brick and mortar” law office. See ABA Formal Op. 498, supra, at 3
(discussing supervision in the virtual practice context); see also ABA Formal Op. 495
(2020) (remote work).
22. ABA Formal Op. 498 at 6.
23 . By citing WSBA Advisory Opinion 2215, we do not imply that cloud computing and
AI are equivalent technologies. For present purposes, however, they share the common
trait of potentially holding client confidential information.
24. ABA Formal Opinion 477R includes a similar set of factors to evaluate vendors
handling client confidential material at 9. An “appropriate interval” will necessarily vary
with both the vendor (for example, a vendor affirmatively amends its terms of use) and
technology (what is “state of the art” today may no longer be so in the future).
25. See, e.g., ABA Formal Op. 517 at 5-6 (2025) (discussing the use of AI tools in jury
selection and making the point that the lawyer-user—not the AI tool—remains ultimately
response for the work involved).
26. In his 2023 Year-End Report, Chief Justice Roberts noted (at 4) that before the U.S.
Supreme Court bought its first photocopier in 1969, most internal memoranda were typed
on carbon paper and duplicated on a hot-lead printing press.
27. Competent use also includes understanding and complying with any applicable court
rules on AI.
28. RPC 1.6(c) was added in 2016. See Washington Supreme Court Order 25700-A-
1146, supra. The Washington amendment followed a similar amendment to the ABA
Model Rules in 2012 as a part of the ABA Ethics 20/20 Commission’s suggested
amendments. See ABA Legislative History, supra, at 143-46.
29. See Mata v. Avianca, Inc., supra, 678 F. Supp.3d at 457.
30. See Washington RPC 1.6, cmt. 3 (discussing the relationship between the
confidentiality rule, attorney-client privilege and work product).
31. See In re Cross, 198 Wn.2d 806, 820, 500 P.3d 958 (2021).
32. See also ABA Formal Op. 477R, supra, at 9 (listing criteria similar to Washington
Advisory Op. 2215).
33. See Texas State Bar Ethics Op. 705 at 4 (2025) (addressing the issue of potential
vendor use of information).
Page 16 of 17
34. See also RPCs 1.2(a) (lawyer consultation with clients on the means used to carry
out a client’s work), RPC 1.4 (communication with client). See generally ABA Formal Op.
08-451 (2008) (discussing outsourced legal and support services).
35. As discussed earlier, this includes both understanding them when acquired and
monitoring changes in, for example, end-user agreements and privacy policies that impact
confidentiality.
36. See ABA Formal Op. 506, supra, at 2 (use of technology to assist client intake); RPC
1.18 (duties to prospective clients); see also WSBA Advisory Op. 20280 (2006) (client
intake through law firm web sites); Barton v. U.S. District Court, 410 F.3d 1104 (2005)
(same).
37. Depending on the circumstances, court orders, discovery agreements between the
parties, or other substantive legal restrictions may limit the information that can be shared
with an AI tool.
38. ABA Formal Op. 512, supra, at 9.
39. If the procedural rules in a particular court require disclosure of a lawyer’s use of AI
tools in preparing submissions, then RPC 3.4(c) generally requires a lawyer to follow the
rule.
40. Potential court sanctions for inaccurate citations and related issues are beyond the
scope of this opinion. Courts have made plain, however, that a lawyer’s risk in this regard
is not limited to possible regulatory discipline. See generally Park v. Kim, 91 F.4th 610 (2d
Cir. 2024) (discussing duties Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 in context of lawyer who used AI tool in
preparing brief that generated fictitious citation).
41. RPC 5.3 is entitled “Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants.” ABA Model
Rule 5.3, by contrast, uses the word “Assistance” rather than “Assistants.” The ABA
version was changed from “assistants” to “assistance” in 2012 to reinforce that the rule
applies to both nonlawyer employees of a law firm and nonlawyer independent contractors
who are working with the firm. See ABA Legislative History at 604. Washington did not
adopt this semantic change. Read in context, both rules refer to human nonlawyers—
including vendors supplying services. See generally LK Operating, LLC v. Collection
Group, LLC, 181 Wn.2d 48, 75-76, 331 P.3d 1147 (2014) (RPCs interpreted using
principles of statutory construction). Purely technological “virtual assistants”—at least
pending clarifying amendments to either the text or the comments of the rules
concerned—are governed by a lawyer’s duties of competence and confidentiality
discussed earlier.
42. RPC 1.0A(c) defines “firm” broadly to include law firms, corporate and governmental
law departments, and similar organizations. We use the term “firm” here in that broad
sense.
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43. See ABA Formal Ops. 08-451, supra (addressing outsourced legal and support
services) and 477R, supra (discussing the use of outside vendors for electronic
communication, data transmission and file storage). See also ABA Formal Op. 512,
supra, at 11 (suggesting application of approaches used to vet other law practice
technology for compliance with the duty of confidentiality to AI tools).
44. See also WSBA Advisory Op. 2120 (2006) (billing for expenses); ABA Formal Op. 93-
379 (1993) (same).
45. Absher Const. Co. v. Kent School Dist. No. 415, 79 Wn. App. 841, 848, 917 P.2d
1086 (1995); In re Guardianship of Hays, 2013 WL 4607075 at *6 (Wn. App. Aug. 26,
2013) (unpublished) (citing Absher on this point); Amkal v. Cingular Wireless, Inc., 2007
WL 9775545 at *3 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 7, 2007) (unpublished) (same).
*****
Advisory Opinions are provided for the education of the Bar and reflect the opinion of the Committee on
Professional Ethics (CPE) or its predecessors. Advisory Opinions are provided pursuant to the authorization
granted by the Board of Governors, but are not individually approved by the Board and do not reflect the
official position of the Bar association. Laws other than the Washington State Rules of Professional Conduct
may apply to the inquiry. The Committee's answer does not include or opine about any other applicable law
other than the meaning of the Rules of Professional Conduct.